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since the early-1980s, the major problems facing the
local construction companies have been the dull
construction demand and the intense competition of the
giant overseas construction companies in the local market.
Gammon (HK) Ltd is one of the largest local
construction companies and have been very active in the
local construction projects. Its major focus was on large
projects with very high contract value. In particular, it
showed more interest in the civil engineering projects.
However, the giant overseas contractors( particularly the
Japanese and Korean ones who tendered at very low prices
and offered financial packages in the projects) were also
very active in the large projects. Moreover, the local
construction market is also likely to offer more building
projects and less civil engineering type of projects in
the near future. This explained why the Gammon (HK) Ltd
have experienced deteriorating turnover and profit under
strong competition in a shrinking market segment in the
mid-1980s.
Certain strategic changes are recommended to help
the Company to maintain its market share and achieve a
balanced coverage of its different market segments. It
should enter into more jointventures with overseas
contractors instead of competing head-on with them in
both big civil engineering and building projects over
HK$15 million. In addition to this, it should concentrate
more on the prospering building segments,in particular the
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public housing and the small private residential
buildings which were originally dominated by the smaller
local contractors. The Company would be in a more
advantageous position competing directly with the local
contractors rather than with the giant overseas ones.
The Marketing Department of the Company has been
under-staffed and performed solely an
information-gathering and reporting role. e.g., mainly to
gather market intelligence about potential individual
project opportunities. The author recommends that the
Company strengthen its marketing research and selling
functions. e.g., to do comprehensive research to find out
which specific market segments in the local or overseas
market will offer the best opportunities to the Company in
terms of their competitive environment and future
construction demand. Actively cultivating closer business
relationships with the clients and architectural
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1CHAPTER I
:NTRODUCTION
Overall View of the Industry
uue to the limited space of land and the high
density of. the population in Hong Kong, the construction
companies played a very important role in providing Hong
Kong people with adequate living space and the basic
transportation infrastructure (e.g. the roads, highways
and ports). Along with the property-developing companies,
their importance to the Hong Kong economy can be seen by
accounting for about half of the total weighting of the
local stock market indicator -the Hang Seng Index.
The cyclical nature of this industry was highlighted
when its ups and downs were traced since early 1970s. The
local construction industry began to boom since 1973 when
the Hong Kong Government announced its public housing
programme to accommodate the low-income inhabitants.
However, this boom came to a stop when the recession of
the world economy occurs in 1974 and 1975. This difficult
period 'came to an end in 1976 when the Hong Kong
Government decided to go ahead with the HK$ 5 billion Mass
Transit Railway (MTR) project to be completed within three
years. However, this also attracted a number of
international contractors to bid for the construction
projects and compete with local constructon firms, notably
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the well-established and financially strong Japanese
contractors.
The construction market was on the up-swing until
its peak at 1982, with total expenditure on the building
and civil engineering construction projects increasing
constantly from HK$ 9.4 billion in 1976 to HK$ 20.42
billion in 1982( measured at 1980 constant price),
refer to Table 1. However, the market started to slide
down from 1983 to 1985 with the total expenditure
declining form HK$20.37 billion in 1983 to HK$17.5 billion
in 1985( measured at 1980 constant price).
This situation was aggravated by the fact that
increased overseas competitors were getting into the local
construction market. Especially the large Japanese (They
sought other construction projects after the completion of
the MTRC project) and Korean construction firms, they
were bidding at unreasonably low prices because they have
stronger financial support and were willing to accept very
lower profit margins. This brought about the sales and
profit margin decline for most local contractors in 1984
and 1985.
After three consecutive years of shrinkage, the
industry performed better and entered the consolidation
stage in 1986. The Hong Kong Government expected the
industry to perform better in 1987, forecasting that it
will enjoy a real growth of 9% over 1986 in terms of
total construction expenditure., This figure was higher
than the forecast local GDP real growth rate of 6.2%.
However, the cut-throat competiton from overseas
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contractors was expected to continue to exert pressure on
the local contractors in the near future.
Objective of the Research
The objective of this research is to analyse the
prospects and competition within the local construction
industry. More specifically, the author will like to take
the perspective of the Gammon (HK) Ltd as an example to
see- how it covered the different segments of the
construction market, which marketing functions should be
strengthened and improved in order to better cover the
local market and maintain its market position under the
severe competition pressure. The framework of this paper
is started with the analysis of the company profile,
industrial profile and competitive profile to identify the
marketing problems encountered by the company. Then
appropriate marketing objectives and strategies are
recommended to the company to solve these marketing
problems.
Methodology
There are three major sources of information.
Firstly, it is the various publications of the Hong Kong
Government, magazines and newspapers. Secondly, the
internal documents and record of Gammon (HK) Ltd, some of
which are considered to be highly confidential. Thirdly,
through formal interviews with some executives in Gammon
(HK) Ltd and informal interviews with various personnel
4in the construction industry, some valuable information




FROM 1976 TO 1986 (IN HK MILLION)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Atcurrent Prices
Building 2,859 4,067 5,134 8,075 11,495 14,165
Private 2,502 3,528 4,053 6,451 9,086 11,304
Public 357 539 1,081 1,624 2,409 2,861
Civil Engineering 1,830 2,809 3,502 4,264 5,128 5,772
360 507 568 685 1,440 1,506Private
1,470 2,302 2,934 3,579 3,688 4,26EPublic
41689 6,876 8,636 12,339 16,623 19,937Total
2,862 4,035 4,621 7,136 10,526 12,810Private
1,827 2,841 4,015 5,203 6,097 7,127Public
39.0 41.3 46.5 42.2 36.7 35.7Public's share
At Constant (1980) Prices
5,741 7,449 8,226 9,455 11,495 12,703Wilding
5,024 6,462 6,495 7,553 9,086 10,137Private
717 987 1,731 1,902 2,409 2,566Public
31674 5,144 5,612 4,992 5,128 5,177Civil Engineering
723 928 910 802 1,440 1,351Private
2,951 4,216 4,702 4,190 3,688 3,826Public
rotas 9,41512,59313,83814,44716,62317,885,7477,3907,4058,35510,52611,481
Private
3,668 5,203 6,433 6,092 6,097 6,39
Public
39.0 41 1. 46.5 42.2 36.7 35Public's share
5,747 7,390 7,405 8,355 10,526 11,488
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(Cont'd Table 1) 1982 1983 1984 1R% 1024
At Current Prices
Building
16,851 16,755 16,664 17,013 18,186
Private
13,059 12,857 12,778 13,411 14,248
Public
3,792 3,898 3,886 3,602 3,938
Civil Engineering
7,936 8,357 7,750 5,789 6,057
Private
1,388 1,382 1,501 1,515 2,033
Public
6,548 6,975 6,249 4,274 4,024
Total 24,787 25,112 24,414 22,802 24,243
Private 14,447 14,239 14,279 14,926 16,281
Public 10,340 10,873 10,135 7,876 7,962
Public's share 41.7 43.3 41.5 34.5 32.8
At Constant 0 980) Prices
Building 13,885 13,603 13,058 13,139 13,248
Private 10,763 10,438 9,975 10,105 10,059
Public 3,122 3,165 3,083 3,034 3,189
Civil Engineering 6,532 6,770 6,052 4,369 4,276
Private 1,143 1,120 1,172 1,143 1,430
Public 5,389 5,650 4,880 3,226 2,846
Total 20,417 20,373 19,110 17,508 17,524
Private 11,906 11,558 11,147 11,248 11,489
Public 8,511 8,815 7,963 6,260 6,035
Public's share 41.7 43.3 41.7 35.8 34.4




Market Segments in the Industry
The target markets of the local contractors can be
broadly divided into private and public sector. Private
sector was the private property developers, e.g. the big
ones included the Hong Kong Land Company Ltd, Cheung Kong
(Holdings) Ltd, Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd, New World
Development Co Ltd and the Swire Properties Ltd which were
engaged in property transactions and property development
activities. The private sector was mainly engaged in the
building projects and certain small-scale civil
engineering ones. On the other hand, the public sector
included different Government Departments that concerned
mainly with the construction of public housing and
large-scale civil engineering work. The project natures
that the contractors engaged in both target markets can be
divided into building and civil engineering works.
This market can be segmented into four broad
categories according to both of their target markets and






Importance of Different Market Segments
In the local construction market structure, the
first market segment (1) private- building segment was
the most important one. It accounted for about 57% of the
total expenditure on construction works in 1986. Its
importance had been increasing slightly from 1976 to 1986
( Refer to Figure 2).
The second largest market segment was the (4) public
civil engineering segment however, its importance had
been decreasing over the same period dramatically from
31.3% to 16.2%. This can be explained by the increasing
local population and more sophisticated development of the
local transportation infrastructure, more expenditure was
allocated to building -especially residential building
while less expenditure was allocated to civil engineering
work. The Government was unlikely to commit hugh
investment with long pay-back period when it approached
the political crisis in 1997. For example, the shelving of
some long-discussed big projects like the Second Airport
and the Lantau Bridges. Another example was after the
completion of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) project to
the Sheung Wan Station of the Island Line in May 1986, the
Government had suspended the plan to further extend the
MTRC lines. Total private and public expenditure on civil
engineering work had been decreasing dramatically, from
39% in 1976 to only 24.4% in 1986. The importance of this
9
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Source: 1987 Economic Prospects p.56 57 Hongkong Government
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market segment was expected to decrease in future.
The third largest market segment was (3) public-
building segment, which was becoming more and more
important in recent years.. Its market share had increased
from only 7.6% in 1976 to 18.2% in 1986. Because the
largest slice of the budget of this segment will be in the
building of public housing, this showed that the local
Government was more committed to providing public housing
for the growing Hong Kong population- particularly those
in the middle-to-lower and the lower-income group of
population. At present, about 30% of total public capital
expenditure and 10% of annual recurrent expenditure were
allocated to public housing development, this compared
favourably with anywhere in the world( far exceeding the
5% of public expenditure generally accepted as being a
desirable target for most developing countries).
Production of public housing was presently maintained at
about 35,000 flats annually, including rental flats,
flats in Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and Private Sector
Participation Scheme (PSPS). The importance of this
segment was expected to increase in future.
The smallest market segment was (2) private- civil
engineering segment whose market share 'had increased
slightly from 7.7% to 8.2% during the decade.1
Summary
In sum, the market share of building segment were
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increased from 61% in 1976 to 75.6% in 1986 as compared
with that of the civil engineering counterpart which
were decreased from 39% to 24.47 in the same period. The
Government was maintaining its market share at below 42%
of the total construction expenditure over the decade
(except 46.5% in 1978), while shifting its atttenti on
from civil engineering projects into building ones.
It was noticed that the Government projects were
motivated by serving the community and facilitating the
economic growth in Hong Kong, so that its expenditure was
very stable. over this decade. On the other hand, the
amount of expenditure spent on the private projects
fluctuated widely with the change in the local economic,
political climate( especially the 1997 issue) and the
property market conditions. This was due to the fact that
private property developments were motivated by the
self-interest and profit-seeking nature of private
developers.
In light of this, for the contractors that expect to
secure a stable source of job opportunity, Government
project particularly those initiated by the Housing
Authority, offers a very good opportunity.





Influx of International Contractors
Since early 1980, the overriding problem facing the
local contractors was the active participation in the
local construction projects by the international
contractors. These large Japanese and Korean contractors
were bidding at extremely low prices that local
contractors experienced decline in both market share and
profit margin. Paul Y Construction Company announced
operation profit had dropped 20% for 1985.1 Another big
contractor- Franki Investment Ltd also reported its
sales and net profit dropped in 1985.2 Some small to
medium size local contractors were even driven out of
business in the mid-1980s.
Shrinking Profit Margin for Local Contractors
The depressed profit margin for contractors was obvious
when the relationship between building costs and tender
prices was compared. The building cost index- Building
Development Department's Consolidated Labour/Material Cost
Index rose 3.7% In 19853- showing the labour and material
cost for construction projects was rising steadily. While
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the tender price index in both private and public sectors
remained quite constant in 1985. The index for private
sector- the Levett and Bailey Tender Price Index increased
by 2%, the index for public sector- the Architectural
Offices Tender Price Index showed a 2.6% increase.
The wider the gap between the tender price index and
material costs (refer to Fig. 3) indicated that contractors
were not bidding with higher bidding prices along with the
increasing material/labour cost, instead, they were cutting
profit margins in order to tender for both the private and
public projects. The Japanese contractors were so
concerned about their local market share that they would
even bid at a loss to gain the market share- pushing the
tender price even lower.
The Cause of the Influx
The Japanese, Korean and the People's Republic of
China (hereafter refer to PRC) contractors were flooding
into the local construction market due to different
reasons.
The participation of Japanese contractors can be
traced back to 1976 when the local Mass Transit Railway
(hereafter refer to MTR) project began. Kumagai Gumi Co.,
Aoki Co. and Mitsui Co. were some of the most active ones
in the MTR projects and also some recent projects. With
the Japanese domestic housing and civil works expected to
be sluggish through 1986 and 1987, it was expected that
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Source: Shui On Quarterly p.18 December 1986
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The Korean contractors were active participants in the
construction projects of the Middle East. The oil shock in
1979 had boosted the construction projects in countries
like Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, they attracted dozens
of Korean contractors to participate in the large-scale
development projects. But since 1982, the declining world
oil price had affected badly the development programs. By
1983, twenty Korean contractors in the Middle East went
bankrupt and a lot of others are in financial trouble. The
Korean Government played a behind-the-scene role to help
them to survive and explore other overseas markets. Hong
Kong had been one of their major targets since 1983.5
The PRC investment in the local economy had increased
since the signing of the Sino-British agreement in Sept
1984, this can be explained by political reasons that the
PRC was increasing its commitment in Hong Kong to retain
the confidence of local inhabitants in the colony. The
influx of the PRC contractors in recent years was
presumably due to this cause. On the other hand, the PRC
contractors can learn and enhance their technological level
and know-how when working with the local contractors on the
joint-venture projects.
Competitive Advantages of Overseas Contractors
The most active overseas contractors in the local
market were the Japanese, Korean and the PRC contractors
in the mid-1980s. Their competitive edges over local
competitors were mainly their financial and technical
17
capability.
(A) They offered favourable terms in the financial
packages in addition to their low bidding prices (at very
low or even below-cost prices) to the clients. For
example, the deferred payment and build first, pay later
packages were some of the usual financial packages offered
to the client. This was different from the traditional
periodical payment method where contractors were being
paid monthly by the clients for the job they had done
during the month.
Kumagai Gumi Co. was one of the most active Japanese
contractors in the local and the PRC construction market.6
For example, in winning the contract for the Second Cross
Harbour Tunnel, the Kumagai Gumi Co. and the
China-controlled CITIC (China International Trust
Investment Corporation) offered to provide one-third of
the initial capital of HK$ 2.7 billion for the project and
committed to contribute further capital for the project if
the high interest rate may increase the construction costs
in future. This kind of financial capability was not
quite possible for the local contractors. The bargaining
power of the property developers (buyers) was enhanced
due to the increasing number of contractors (sellers) and
their cut-throat competition, the local construction
market was turned into a buyers' market from a sellers'
market.
It was also revealed that in bidding for the HK$ 300
million Tuen Mun New Town Plaza project, the
China-controlled China Overseas Construction.Co. offered
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"build first, pay later payment method and took up part
of the buildings in place of the construction cost as the
terms in the bidding package.? It was noticed that
contractors were participating in the role of the
developers and sharing part of their financial risks (the
risk of being able to sell or rent the developed premises
at a reasonable price). Of course, this required
contractors with strong financial resources and willing to
take the risk of developer. To survive these kind of
competitions, local contractors were rendered in a
strategically disadvantageous position due to their
comparatively weak financial backing and their
unwillingness to share part of the financial risks of the
property developers.
One factor contributing to their good financial
resources was that some overseas contractors could get the
home Government-subsidy and export credit of their
construction equipment and material from home to bid in
the overseas operations. For example, the South Korean
Government announced in 1984 that it would put up US$ 100
million to support the international projects obtained by
South Korean Construction Companies. This money would
come from the Government-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea
to subsidize the contractors to provide financing for
property developers in overseas operation. A large
portion of the financing were granted to the giant
contractors like the Hyundai Engineering and Construction
Co. and Daewoo Corporation, both were very active in the
local construction market. The Japanese Government,
through arrangements with banks and trading firms,. also
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offered its overseas con tractors low-interest loans and
preferential treatment in exporting their construction
equipments and material.
The fact that some Japanese and Korean contractors
belonged to the conglomerate giant Korean General Trading
Companies or Japanese "Sogo-Shosha "(Japanese General
Trading Company) had made the contractors get easy access
to huge financial resources. For example, one active
Japanese contractor in the local market was the Mitsui
Construction Company- which belonged to the giant Mitsui
group.
The Mitsui group was the second largest Sogo Shosha
in Japan that had annual sales in excess of US$ 30
billion. Mitsui group was a highly diversified
conglomerate group that engaged in trading of chemicals,
fuel, metal, textile and other products. Within the
group, there were financial institutes like the Mitsui
Bank and the Mitsui Trust Banking Company. The Nippon
Seiko Sho that dealt with steel, the Mitsui Shipbuilding
and Engineering that dealt with construction equipments.8
In this way the Mitsui Construction Company was in a
somewhat backward-integrated position due to its close
relationships with the banks and the construction
equipment and material suppliers within the group.
(B) These Japanese and Korean competitors were
usually giants when contrasting with the local
contractors, they had the most advanced state-of-art
construction technology and method They also had
efficient and large mechanical plant size which put them
in a more strategically advantageous position,
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particularly in civil engineering projects which took more
technical capability and plant facility, when competing
with local contractors. On the other hand, the PRC
contractors had lower technological level and know-how
than the local contractors.
Competition in Different Market Segments
The competition in the public sector can be observed
easier because all the bidding details and the identity of
winning contractors were clearly revealed in the
Government Gazettes systematically, while the bidding
details in the private sectors were only revealed
periodically in the newpapers, contractors' magazines or
through some inside information channel in the industry.
Most of these overseas competitors were very active in
tendering for big civil engineering projects. This was the
market originally dominated by the large local
contractors. However, some Japanese contractors forsaw no
substantial increase in big civil engineering jobs were
considering to switch to take more smaller-value building
works in future,9 which was traditionally dominated by the
smaller local contractors.
Public Sector
Among the about 1,000 small and large local and
overseas contractors, only contractors registered with
the Public Works Department. (P.W.D.) in the tender list
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can tender for construction projects initiated by the
Government.
There were two lists of contractors registered with
the P.W.D. List I were contractors whose main presence
and head office was in Hong Kong while List II was
outside Hong Kong. List II contractors had to establish
some form of local representation, this took the form of
a registered office or the appointment of a local agent.
According to .the criteria of main presence and head
office, List I contractors were termed local contractors
and List II contractors were termed overseas ones.
However, this criteria of separating only the List II
contractors as overseas contractors was somewhat
ambiguous, there were about twenty contractors in the
List I which were in fact financied by overseas capital,
they were being put in the List I because there was no
List II listings when they first entered Hong Kong in
early 1970s. In light of this, the List I contractors
with foreign capital can also be called the overseas
contractors.
Both lists can only tender for the categories of
jobs they were registered, these categories were divided
1. Buillding tenders
2. Civil engineering tenders, which can also be divided
into:
a. Port Works





The List I contractors were subdivded into three
groups:
Group A of contractors can only tender for
contracts not exceeding HK$ 3 million, Group B of
contractors can tender for contracts not exceeding HK$ 15
million and Group C of contractors that may tender for
contracts of unlimited value.
List II overseas contractors were only eligible to
tender for contracts from HK$ 15 million to unlimited
value, a licence of Group X (equivalent to Group C in
List I) was required for a specific category of job. So
that Group A and Group B contractors were protected from
overseas competitors. List II overseas contractors were
eligible to bid for contracts with unlimited value when
they entered the local market immediately was behind the
rationale that they were usually big contractors with
sound financial resources and worldwide construction
experience.
For local contractors in List I to be upgraded from
Group A to Group B or from Group B to Group C, they were
being evaluated on the following three criteria:
1. They should have some years of good track record of
doing the specific categories of projects before. For
building projects the contractors should have a lot of
experience in building works.
2. The financial background of the contractors is
important for determining which groups in List I should
the contractors be qualified. For contractors with good
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financial resources and no cash-flow problems, they can
take projects with higher contract value limit.
3. The contractors' in-house mechanical plant and
technical personnel available can determine whether they
can be registered in Group C List I. For civil
engineering projects, availability of sufficient
earthmoving equipments and chartered engineers are very
important considerations.
The contractor had to provide all relevant
information to the Secretary for Lands and Works for
inclusion or upgrading in the separate work categories.
Once a contractor was admitted or upgraded, there
followed a probationary period. Contractors in Group A.
or B can be awarded any number of contracts in any of the
different work categories during this period, provided
that the total value of works in any one category did not
exceed the imposed value. Probationary contractors in
Group C can be awarded any number of contracts less than
HK$ 15 million as well as two contracts which did not
exceed HK $40 million. So that the barrier of entrance
into different projects in the public sector was
relatively high.
Gammon (HK) Ltd( hereafter refer to the Company)
was qualified in Group C of List I contractors for all
categories of projects, so that it could tender for all
categories of Government projects with any project value.
However, the Company was only interested in projects with
high contract value, which were also the target market of
the overseas competitors. Regarding the Hong Kong
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Government's policy not to allow List II contractors to bid
for projects worth less than HK$15 million. Gammon (HK) Ltd
and other large local contractors should try every means to
defend their market position in this segment, or they have
to participate more in smaller projects to maintain their
market position.
In bidding for contracts over HK$15 million, the major
competitors of the Gammon (HK) Ltd were contractors in
Group C List I and List II (as shown on Table 2), it was
noticed that there were totally ninty-two eligible
competitors for the building projects and for the road and
drainage projects. Of course, only some of them were
really active in the Government projects. For example,
according to the track record, Paul Y Construction was
particulary interested in bidding for Government jobs.
Shui On Building Construction Co Ltd was also very active
in bidding for Government building jobs. The smallest
number of competitors were coming from waterworks and site
formation projects (only fifty-one and sixty-two
contractors were eligible respectively).
By March 1986, there were totally twenty-eight giant
contractors in the industry whose comprehensive
capabilities can cover all kinds of Government building and
civil engineering works- five local and twenty-three
overseas ones. The five local contractors on List I
possesing all five Group C licences were the Gammon (HK)
Ltd., the Shui On Group (Shui On Building Contractors Ltd.
and Harbour Construction Ltd), Dragages et Travaux Publics,
Kumagai Gumi (HK) Ltd and Maeda Construction Co. Ltd. The
last three were in fact financed by overseas capital, but
76
TABLE 2
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF LIST I/LIST 11
CONTRACTORS IN 1984/1985






1984 1985% change 1984 1985% chang ein1985




Building 49 48 -2.0 40 44 +10.0 92
47 52 +10.6 68Port Works 16 16 0
Roads 33 36 +9.1 51 56 +9.8 92
Drainages
Site 17 16 -5.9 44 46 +4-5 162
For m ation
Water 15 16 +6.7 32 35 +9.4 1 51
Works
Source: Hongkong Government Gazette, Special Supplement Hongkong
Government Publication Feb.1986
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were put on List I because they entered Hong Kong in the
early 1970. Among the twenty-three overseas contractors
possessing all five licences of Group X, most of them were
Japanese, Korean. and the. PRC groups, reflecting their
dominance in the local large projects.
From Table 2, It was noticed that the total number of
local contractors in the List I were decreasing 3.6% from
1984 to 1985, they were removed from the list by the
Secretary for Lands and Works due to running into financial
problems or blacklisted by PWD due to their concrete
deficiency problem during their previous public housing
construction. On the other hand, the total number of List
II contractors were increasing at the rate of 6.57 during
the same time frame, indicating overseas contractors were
getting more active in the local market.
In the analysis of the projects awarded by the
Government in 1985 (refer to Table 3), it was noticed that
local contractors in List I occupied only 66% of the total
market share, local contractors had higher market share in
the building projects however, its market share in civil
engineering was only 52%- indicating overseas contractors
were extremely active in civil engineering projects,
particularly in the high value ones-of the thirteen civil
engineering projects exceeding HK$ 50 million awarded in
1985, overseas contractors got nine of them or HK$ 921.4
million, which accounted for 71% of the total contract
value as shown in Table 4. The overseas contractors were
in a very advantageous position in this market niche. In
light of this, the local contractors should not compete
head-on with them. Instead, they should try to co-operate
20
TABLE 3
VALUE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
BY TYPES OF CONTRACTORS DURING 1985 (IN HK$ MILLION
Contractor Public Housing Other Housing Civil Engineering Total
Local 1,761 1,696 1,230 4,686
(67.7) (78.7) (52.0) (66.0)
Japanese 427 190 617
(20.0) (8.0) (8.7)
Chinese 111 52 163
(4.3) (2.2) (2.2)
Korean 127 31 431 590
(5.0) (1.5) (18.0) (8.3)
European, 601 468 1,069
U.S., (23-0) (19.7) (15.0)
Australian
others
Total 2,600 2,154 2,370 7,124
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 100.0)
Figures in parentheses represents the percentage of total value




VALUE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING CONTRACTS
EXCEEDING HK$ 50 MILLION AWARDED
BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1985







Source: Hongkong Government Gazette Hongkong Government Publication
May 1986
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with them in the forms of jointventures in this market
segment or enter into other segments to avoid confronting
them.
The Government would invite qualified contractors to
tender through the Hong Kong Government Gazette, which was
published every Friday. The invitation usually appeared
twice, although Housing Authority work was advertised only
once. Tender invitation was open to all qualified
contractors in the List I and List II according to the
project value- this was called open tender. Usually
fifteen to twenty tenderers would tender for each project,
the competition was more severe than in selected tendering
for private projects where only four to six contractors
would tender.
Gammon (HK) Ltd had rather weak relationship with the
Government officials in the Housing Authority than that in
civil engineering works, better relationships should be
cultivated to gain more knowledge of the procedures and
selection criteria for Public Housing tenders.
Private Sector
Unlike the public projects that were advertised
through the formal channel-the Government Gazette, the
private projects news were obtained through newspapers,
contractors' magazines or other inside connections. So
that contractors should monitor carefully these
information sources and not to neglect any tender
opportunities.
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The activities of private sector projects were
closely related to the local property market and lagged
behind it fora period of time. According to Mr Long-
the Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of the
Construction and Contractin Division of the Shui On Group
11' the demand for land by property developers would
usually take six to twelve months to become the derived
demand for the construction services by contractors.
Selective tendering was the most common tendering
method in the private sector. When a property developer
liked to invite contractors to tender for a cetain
construction project, It did not have a set rules or a
standard procedure for choosing contractors, such as the
Code of Procedure for Selective Tendering used in U.K.
The developer who had carried out regular projects might
already prepared a list of familiar contractors. It
might then appoint an Architect Engineer firm (the
consultant), who was responsible for the administration
of the tendering procedures of the construction projects
by the contractors. Before calling the tender, the
consultant would draft up a list of contractors to be
invited and submitted them to the developer for approval.
Then the developer would usually add some more
contractors to be included in the list. For example, in
the development project. of the Victoria Barracks in
August 1986, Swire Properties Ltd (the developer) invited
the Wong Ouyang Company (the Architectural consultant)
to select the contractors to tender for the construction
..r.,+ (_ammnn (HK) Ltd was selected in the tender list
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by the developer.
There were two major influencers who were operating in
the decision-making process to decide who should be
included in the* list- the developer and the consultant.
The criteria for choosing a contractor will be different
for different kinds of projects, the major considerations
were the capabilities, plant capacity, past track record
and reputation of the contractors. However, business and
interpersonal relationships were also playing very
important role in private projects.
There were about 1,000 construction companies in the
local construction market in early 1987, ranging from the
big contractors like the Gammon (HK) Ltd, the Paul Y.
Construction Co. Ltd and the giant oversea contractors to
the very small construction firms which engaged mainly in
performing the subcontract works for the big contractors.
Some of these contractors had close business
relationship with the private developers. For example, Hip
Hing Construction Co. Ltd is a subsidiary of New World
Development Co. Ltd, Hopewell Construction Co. Ltd belongs
to the Hopewell Group which also engaged in property
development activities. The same case appears for Shui On
Building Contractors Ltd and the Harbour Construction Ltd.,
both of which belong to the Shui on Group Of course, they
will get access to in-house projects easily.
For contractors without close business relationship with
the property developers, they had to cultivate' and maintain
good relationship with both influencers- the developers
and consultants in order to get included in the list for
tendering. It is instrumental that Gammon (HK) Ltd must
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establish more business relationships with other property
developers and consultants if it expects to increase its
market share in the private sector.
Usually about four to six contractors were invited for
each tender in the selective tendering, which contrasted
favourably with that of fifteen to twenty tenderers in the
open tendering of the public sector.
Negotiated tendering was also possible in the private
project tendering. When the developer had very good
relationship with a particular contractor, or the developer
liked to save time and not to go through the long process
of selective tendering (It will usually takes three to six
months from the invitation to tender until the final
acceptance, depending on the nature of the work involved),
then it will directly negotiate the details and price of
the project with a particular contractor. Of course, the
contractor will usually get more favourable terms due to
the lack of other competition, Gammon (HK) Ltd should also
exploit the good relationship with the developers and get
more negotiated jobs under the present cut-throat
competitive environment.
1South China Morning Post 16 July 1985
2Annual.Re ort 1985: Franki Investment Ltd p.25
3Shui On Quarterly June 1986. P. 17
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CHAPTER IV
PROSPECT OF THE INDUSTR'
After some consecutive years of shrinking
construction expenditure, the local Government projected
that. there- would be a 9% real growth in the total
construction expenditure-in 1987 over 1986.
Public Sector
The Government's expenditure can be divided into
two major categories: The fund for the Housing Authority
and the Capital Works Reserve Funds. The Housing
Authority is responsible for the Public Housing programs,
while the Capital Works Reserve Fund was established in
1982 for financing land acquisition and other public
works programs, e.g. the New Town development, civil
engineering, waterworks and other Governmental buildings
and facilities.
The revenue from the Government land sales formed a
very significant portion in the financing of all
Governmental capital works. The Annex III- concerning the
land leases in the .Sino-British Joint Declaration
stipulated two important restrictions (1) restricting the
Hong Kong Government can only sell fifty hectares of land
every year( versus the average of ninty-six hectares in
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the past ten years) and (2) the income from the land
sale will be shared equally between the Hong Kong
Government and the PRC Special Administrative Region
Government. These two restrictions implied that only 5%
of the Hong Kong Government revenue will come from the
land sales in future against the about 33% before the
Sino-British Joint-Declaration. Based on this, the local
Government is most unlikely to increase the budget for
future construction projects except the Public Housing
projects.
The Public Housing Program included three types of
housing projects: (a) the low-cost rental estates (b) the
Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Private Sector
Participation Scheme( PSPS, which was similar to the HOS
but differed from HOS in that the private developers had
to finance the construction of flats for sales to the
public at prices determined by the Government (c) the
redevelopment of the old estates- the demolition of the
old estate blocks and replace them with the modern
domestic blocks and better community facilities.
The Public Housing expenditure in fiscal year 1986
was forecasted to be 3.4 billion, an increase of 8% over
the 3 billion in 1985. The 1986-87 Budget set the
Government target to produce 188,300 units between 1986
to 1989, this amounted to an average of 47,000 units
every year( Refer to Table 5).
The Government had set up a special group,
Public Housing Expendduiture
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ACTUAL/ FORECAST PUBLIC HOUSING PRODUCTION UNITS
FROM 1982-83 TO 1989-90




1982-83 27,87.9 7,508 760 442 36,589
1983-84 28,564 7,877 2,240 10 38,691
10,168 1,408 4191984-85 26,354 38,349
48,3566,688 11,902 2131985-86 29,553
41,9326,838 3,640 1,4341886-87# 30,020
43,5647,610 2,025 1,15c1987-88# 32,770
48,5325,698 4,515 3,0241988-89# 35,295
6,062 5,290 5,607 54,2431989-90# 37,284
# Forecasted figures
HOS: Home Ownership Scheme
PSPS: Private Sector Participation Scheme
Source: The 1986-87 Budget p.87 Hongk.ong Government Publication
March 1986
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convented by the Assistant Director of Housing, Mr. Allen
Crosby, to study the long-term housing needs of the local
private and public sectors. One major finding of the group
was that the demand for the low-cost rental housing would
be met by 1996 while the demand for the Home Ownership
Scheme (HOS) would be met only by 2000 with the existing
public housing supply policy. This was due to the trend
that more people in the middle-to-lower income group( with
the monthly. household income below HK$ 8)000) were more
willing and could afford to own their own housing. The
favourable mortgage plans offered by the local retail
banks. e.g. low interest rates, long repayment period and
the mortgage advance can be as much as 90% of the HOS
flat's purchase price were also contributing to the
low-income groups' desire for owning their own flats. In
conclusion, the study suggested that the Housing Authority
to increase the annual production of Home Ownership Scheme
(HOS) and Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) from
the present 10,000 units to 15,000 units while decreasing
the rental housing supply from the present 30,000 units to
25,000 units.
These HOS and PSPS projects would be a stable source
of projects for contractors without much unpredictable
fluctuations due to economic and political uncertainty,
they also offered the benefit of more innovation in the
building designs, and thus higher profitability for
contractors than the low-cost rental housing projects.
Capital Works Reserve Fund Expenditure
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Atter two years of declining expenditure, the
expenditure from the Capital Works Reserve Fund was
expected to be increased to HK$ 6,625 million in the
fiscal year 1987. The largest share of the Fund (43%) was
being allocated to the New Town Development project,
showing the commitment of the local Government to provide
more sophisticated infrastructures and community
facilities( e.g. the Shatin Cultural Complex and Library
to the populations living in the new HOS and Rental
Housing flats in these new towns.
When the expenditure allocation in 1987 was studied
by areas, the allocation in Shatin, Tai Po/ Fanling,
Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun had declined due to the completion
of some major projects1. On the other hand, the
allocation had increased drastically for Junk Bay, the
significant projects in Junk Bay that were expected to
start in the 1986-87 included the followings:
a.7187CL-Junk Bay Development, head of Bay, stage II
engineering works
b.7194TH-Junk Bay Development-principal access road
c.7045WC-Water Supply to Junk Bay 2
Due to the hilly terrain and the limited space of
land in Hong Kong, the only way to acquire more space to
accomodate the growing population was to reclaim more
land from sea in addition to the New Town Development in
the New Territories. The Government had planned to spend
HK$ 220 billion for harbour reclamation to secure an
additional 1,000 hectares of land within the next decade.
The harbours identified for reclamation included the Hung
Hom Bay and Aldrich Bay, off West Kowloon between Mongkok
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and Stonecutters Island, off Central and Wanchai and
lastly, between Kennedy Town and the Green Island. 3
Apart from providing more space to accomodate the
increasing population, the reclamation will provide more
space for port facilities, the central business districts
and the Kowloon-Canton Railway depot.
However, two worrying trends arising out of the
political issue of 1997 for the public civil engineering
works were worth noticing. The first one was the shelving
or 'indefinite suspension'. of some large projects in recent
years. For example, the Second New Airport, the Lantau
Crossing and the slow down of the Junk Bay Development. The
second one was more civil engineering projects were being
privitised and the trend was likely to increase in future.
e.g.the Light Rail Transit System linking Tuen Mun and Yuen
Long, the Second Harbour Crossing, the Kwai Chung Container
Terminal No. Six and the Tate's Cairn Tunnel. To
successfully bid for these projects. contractors with
strong financial background are in strategically
advantageous positions.
Private Sector
The prospects of the local private property market
could be analysed by the following segments: residential,
office and industrial segments.
Residential Property Market
The performance of the residential marxeL wctb
41
remarkable since 1985. The Land Office registered a total
of 54,400 agreements for Sales and Purchases of private
property units in 1986. e.g., a jump of 82% over 1985,
most of these transactions came from the small and
medium-sized residential units. under 1,000 square feet.
However, the demand for large-size and luxurious
residential units was not as promising as the smaller
counterparts. The property market specialsts expected
this trend to continue in 1986 and 1987 4. Based on the
increased number of households and eliminating the effect
of public housing supply, the Housing Authority predicted
the demand for private residential units would be 152,200
units versus the supply of 125,700 units within 1985 to
1990, representing a shortage of 26,500 units was expected
by the end of 1990.
The strong demand for the small and medium size
residential units was due to the following factors:
(1) After the initialling the Sino-British Joint
Declaration in September 1984, the people in the
middle-to-lower income group felt more secured about the
future of the colony, knowing that they could not afford to
emmigrate and more willing to commit their investment to
the flat ownerships. On the other hand, the upper-income
inhabitants could afford to emmigrate, so that they would
rather rent than commit large amount of money to fixed
assets. e.g. the luxurious and large-size flats for
ownership. One big local property consultant firm, Richard
Ellis predicted that the luxury flat market would be
sluggish for a period to come. The over-supply of large
flats had led to its price squeeze for this category of
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buildings. For example, the Vasalia Garden in the MacDonald
road, Central had registered a price decline of 14% from
December 1985 to April 1986.5
(2) From 1982 *to 1985, there was an average of 49, 500
new couples getting married every year. The local
population in the age group beteen 25 to 30 in 1986
amounted to 600,000 people. This is the age bracket most
likely to get married in Hong Kong.6 The tendency of the
present younger generations to live apart from their
parents after the marriages would facilitate a constant
source of demand for the small and medium flats.
(3) Similar to the situations of the HOS and PSPS flats,
the banks were competing to offer very favourable mortgage
terms to the flat buyers in the mid-1980s, these terms
included (A) the prime rate of interest had decreased from
18.5% in the June 1984. to only 6.5% in early 1987. The
interests for the loan repayment also decreased
accordingly. (B) the repayment period for the loans of the
flats had increased from the minimum of ten-year to
fifteen or twenty-year. (C) the 75% mortgage of the
property values was raised to 85% or 90%. All these
factors had reduced the monthly mortgage payment for people
owning flats. With the relaxation of the rent control, the
mortgage repayment was only slightly higher than that of
the rental payment! No wonder as long as people could
afford to pay for the initial 10% or 15% downpayment of the
property value, they would tend to buy rather than rent
flats. This increasing affordability was likely to generate
an increase in demand for private housing. In December
1986 the mortgage loans granted by banks and
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deposit-taking companies for residential property purchases
totalled HK$ 37 billion, representing a rise of 27% from
December 1985.
Another two indications of the bullish market demand
were the rate of property take-up and the vacancy level.
The take-up of the residential property grew 23% to 29,500
units in 1986 over 1985, while the vacancy level dropped
from 4.5% in 1985 to only 3.3% in 1986.7
Office Market
The demand for office space was also bullish in
1986 and early 1987 due to the influx of some major U.S.
and Japanese firms into Hong Kong after the resolution of
the 1997 issue. The take-up was 385,000 sq. meters in
1985. e.g., surpassing the total production level of
308,000 sq. meters during the same year. The vacancy
level also dropped from 13.8% in 1985 to 11.1% in 1986.
The Rating. and Valuation Department registered that the
production level of the office flat had declined from
308,000 sq. meters in 1985 to merely 72,000 sq. meters in
1986. This lowest annual production level since 1982
would surely encourage more office flat construction in
the next few years.
The three major off ice_=dis-t=ricts. in Hong Kong were
Central, Tsimshatsui and Wanchai. According to the
facilities and locations'--af, the of fice, buildings, they
can be divided into three different gr-ades
Grade A: Well-constructed, designed and managed,
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centrally air-conditioned premises in suitable locations
within the commercial district.
Grade B: Less superior buildings in good locations or high
quality buildings on secondary locations within the
district.
Grade C: Poorer buildings on less attractive locations
within the district.
The largest demand for office spaces was for the
Grade A office spaces in the Central District, it showed a
dramatic increase from the take-up rate of 43,000 sq.
meters in 1984 to 153,.000 sq. meters in 1986. On the other
hand, the supply of office space for this category of
building had decreased from 168,000 sq. meters in 1984 to
only 10,200 sq. meters in 1986 due to the prime sites
available for being developed into office buildings were
very limited in this area.8 The property developers had to
resort to two means to meet the demand. Firstly, they
redeveloped their existing properties. e.g. the Hong Kong
Bank Building and the Standard Chartered Bank Building,
there is also the plans to redevelop the Central Post
Office and the Entertainment Building into first-class
commercial buildings. Another means was to move the core
Central eastwards. e.g. development of the Victoria
Barracks Site I and II in the Admiralty by the Swire
Properties Ltd, this trend offered major companies a good
alternative to. acquire office spaces in the Central
district.
Commanding a higher rental and selling price level
than its counterparts in Wanchai and Tsimshatsui district,
Central office space seemed to project a more prestigeous
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image and convenient locations( access to the major local
banks and financial institutes). No wonder most trading
firms are located in Wanchai and Tsimshatsui while most
headquarters of the multi-national firms are located in
Central. Some well-established firms in Hong Kong also
relocated their offices to Central during 1986. For
example, the Inchcape Group moved its headquarter from
Elizabeth House in Wanchai to the Fleet House in Central.
The Cartier( Far East) Co. relocated from Tsimshatsui to
the Connaught Centre in Central.9
Due to Gammon (HK) Ltd's good connection with the
Hong Kong Land( which was the biggest property owner in
Central in 1987) and the Swire Properties Ltd. There were
a lot of opportunities for commercial building construction
projects.
Industrial Property Market
The construction demand for factory space depended
on the industrialists' intention to make long-term
capital investments. The industrialsts were presently
more hesitated in making these investment commitment.
Partly due to the rise in protectionism in most of the
Hong Kong's major exporting markets (notably U.S. market)
and partly. due to the 1997 issue. This had led to the
1985 domestic exports decline by 5% in real terms, which
the increase of 14% in 1983 and 17% in 1984. The
followed
growing protectionist measures in these markets were
unlikely to relax within the foreseeable future, so that
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the demand for local industrial premises was not very
promising in the next few years.
The supply of flatted factory in 1986 reached
863,000 sq. meters as compared with only 456,000 sq.
meters in 1985 however, the take-up of industrial space
in 1986 fell a sharp 54% from the 397,000 sq. meters of
1985. Which was the lowest level in the past decade.
This lowest level of take-up was an indication of
the industrialsts' hesitant to make the long-term
investment in the industrial premises. The property
consultants expected that the existing industrial space
would take more than three years to be absorbed. In light
of this, there would be a slow down in the demand for the
construction projects in the industrial property segment.
Summary
The prospect of the construction market will be
brighter in 1987 than in 1986. It is also expected that
the total expenditure increase will be higher for private
sector than the public sector. In the public sector, the
Government will concentrate its effort on the Public
Housing Programs and the New Town
Development-particularly the Home Ownership Scheme
projects. On the other hand, the largest construction
demand in the private segment is expected to come from
the medium-to-small size residential housing and the
commercial building projects.
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1Estimates for the Year Ending 31 March 1987 Vol.2.
Revenue, Funds and Statistical Appendix. P.90
2 ibid. p.28
3 Hong Kong Standard 21 August 1985
4 South China Morning Post 7 July 1986
5 ibid. 9 June 1986
6 Hong Kong Economic Journal 17 July 1986
7 Property Review 1986 Rating and Valuation
Department. p.52
8 ibid. p.12





Gammon (HK) Ltd.. was a joint venture of the Jardine,
Matheson Co of Hongkong and the Trafalgar House PLC of
the U.K. Through its principals,. Gammon (HK) Ltd could
draw on the expertise of Cementation (the International
Constructon Division of Trafalgar House) and Jardines'
Asia-wide network of offices, whose staff had substantial
knowledge of their respective domestic environment.
Ever since its incorporation in Hong Kong as a
private company in 1958, it had been engaging in a wide
range of commercial and residential building development,
civil engineering and foundation works in Hong Kong, the
PRC, Macau, Singa pore, Malaysia and certain other
South-east Asian countries. The company had more than
5,000 employees in Hong Kong in 1986, its involvement in
the development of Hong Kong's infrastructure can be seen
in some major completed projects, its participation in
Hong Kong included the construction of the Connaught
Centre, Century Tower, Exchange Square, Taikoo Shing,
Castle Peak Cement Plant, Hong Kong Island Eastern
Corridor, High Island Water Scheme and other big projects.
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It is now one of the largest local contractors in Hong
Kong.
Its company objective is to complete the
construction projects according to the following criteria:
1. to build to the highest possible standard.
2. to build safely and efficiently.
3. to build within programme.
4. to build within budget.
Its marketing objective is to identify as much
project opportunities as possible in the four different
market segments and then select those projects that meet
the company objective and different criteria for
tendering. In this way the local market share can be
maintained through the successful tenderings. It is
noticed that the Company is very concerned about its
market share and it strives very hard to maintain its
present market leadership position.
Company Performance
Over 80% of the annual turnover of Gammon (HK) Ltd
was in the Hong Kong area within the last four years.
Referring to Table 6, its annual turnover in Hong Kong had
been decreasing since 1983 to 1986 from HK$ 2.1 billion to
HK$ 1.9 billion due to the downturn of the construction
industry and increased competition from overseas
contractors. Its market share in the total local building
and civil engineering projects had also decreased from
8.36% in 1983 to 7.86% in 1986. In light of the fact that
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TABLE 6
PERFORMANCE OF THE GAMMON (HK) LTD IN HONG KONG
Turnover (in HK$ million)
1983 1984 1985 1986





Market Share (in percentage I




Source: Internal document of Gammon (HK) Ltd
1.901
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the Company is a private company, it did not want to
reveal its profit and other financial figures. The only
fact that it revealed is that its profitability for
building projects was slightly higher than that for civil
engineering ones in recent years.
Traditionally, Gammon (HK) Ltd had been particularly
active in the local large-scale civil engineering works.
This was becasue the Company was very experienced and had
good track record in this field, the company also had a
certain amount of expensive mechanical plants. e.g.
cranes, tractors and other earthmoving equipments which
were essential for civil engineering works. However, the
annual turnover of the Company in civil engineering job
was decreasing drastically from 1983 to 1986 while there
was an increase in building projects. The drastic decline
in the civil engineering segment was due to the following
two major causes. Firstly, the total expenditure on civil
engineering work in Hong Kong had decreased from HK$ 8.357
billion in 1983 to only HK$ 6.057 billion in 1986 (Refer
to Table 1) and secondly, the large-scale civil
engineering work was the target segment that attracted
the giant overseas cobtractirs most
Observation and Discussion
Before getting into in-depth analysis of the market
organizational structure and the tendering characteristics
will be discussed here.
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Firstly, as detailed in Chapter II, it was observed
that the motivations and needs for different target
customers to engage in different projects were different.
The Government projects were motivated by the continual
commitment of the Government to allocate a certain budget
to serve the community. Its main concern for the projects
was to build economically- to save tax-payers' money. The
Government's concern for the safety and quality of its
projects was also growing with the concrete deficiency of
its public housing estates. According to a structural
survey report released by the Housing Authority, the
Housing Department had over 523,677 units of living
quarters in 1099 blocks of housing estate, over half of
the blocks required repair of one sort or another due to
the concrete deficiency or other problems by March 1985.
On the other hand, the private property developers'
concern for economical budget may possibly not be as much
as that of the Government, they will concern more for the
innovative and modern design and construction method.
Private property developers may also consider financial
packages for the projects more important than that of the
Government. In sum, the private sector offered more
opportunities for innovative and flexible tendering than
in public sector.
Gammon (HK) Ltd is rather production-oriented and
technical-oriented rather than customer-oriented in the
tender submission approach, There are two Divisions in
the Tendering Department. The Division engaging in
Building Tendering is separated from that of the Civil
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Engineering. Each Division is handling both public and
private sector works without formal separation in
personnel and management.
It is recommended that different tender submission
strategies be followed for different target markets for
the two Tendering Divisions of the Company, so that their
specific needs are taken care of. If more human resources
are available, different personnel should be in charge of
the separate private and public sectors in the respective
Division of the Tendering Department. Of course, ideally,
the Company should set up the Private Sector Division and
the Public Sector Division. So that the Division Head in
the Private Sector Division can establish a closer
business relationship with the property developers and
have a better understanding of the characteristics and
needs of them. Similar benefit will incur for the Public
Sector Division.
Secondly, the Marketing Department of the Company
functioned mainly as an information-gathering and
reporting role but it did not perform a very good
record-keeping and marketing research function due to the
lack of staff. e. g. the successful and unsuccesful tenders
were not kept in the cost data base, this made their
extraction and revision very time-consuming and
convenient. The procedure for selecting potential tender
opportunities was done in a very subjective and informal
manner by the Tendering Department. It is recommended that
the tender selection process should be a more systematic
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and formal one. Each selection criterion (e.g. the
expected profitability, duration, jointventureship
opportunity and chance of success for the projects. etc.)
should be assigned points, then each criterion should be
assigned different weights according to their importance
in different market segments (weights and pointsd should
be assigned according to the track record of past
successful and unsuccessful tenders and other
considerations). The total points can be systematically
calculated to see if the projects should be pursued. This
more standardized and objective approach will have two
major advantages, firstly, it will reduce the cost and
time of preparing tenders that have very slim successful
chance and secondly, it will reduce the chance of missing
good tender opportunities.
Coverage of the Local Market
How the company covered its target segments could be
analysed by studying the different segments by three sets
of figures for contract value both above and below HK$ 15
million( the selection of this amount was due to the fact
that Group A and Group B of List I local contractors can
not bid for public contracts over this amount, so that this
amount will serve as a good criteria for separating large
and small projects), these three sets of figures are as
follows: (1) how many tenders were called during this
period that came to the Company's attention (Government
Gazette notice in public sector, newspaper, contractors'
55
magazine and inside informaton are major sources in
private sector). (2) how many among them could really meet
the different criteria of the company( e.g. the duration,
contract value and profitability of the projects, expected
chance of success, construction method and design of the
projects, etc.), so that the company was interested in and
tendered for it. (3) how many tenders really turned out to
be successful.
From these three items, their relationships can be
determined and then how different market segments can be
strengthened can be interpreted in terms of their
coverages.
The time frame of this study was for a one-year
period from 1 October 1985 to 30 September 1986. The
tenders selected were those that were called and the
acceptances/ rejections were known during the period. The
one-year period was used to isolate the effect of annual
seasonal fluctuations in the construction demand.
For example,in the segment of public-civil
engineering with contract value over HK$ 15 million:
(1) No. of invitations to tender for Group C for List 1
Contractors (who were eligible for tenders of unlimited
value) appeared in the Government Gazette: 41.
(2) No. of tenders that the company was interested in and
tendered for: 24-
(3) No. of success: 1.
Ratio of interest: (2)/(1)= 24/41= 0.585= 58.5%
showed the percentage of tenders the company was interested
in tendering out of the tenders available.' If the ratio
was high, it showed that the Company was very interested in
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this kind of project.
Ratio of success: (3)/(2)= 1/24= 4.27 showed the
percentage of successful tenders out of the tenders
submitted.
Other segments could be tabulated in similar manner.
The respective ratio would be shown in Table 7.
Civil Enineerin Sement
The Company's local market share in this segment were
decreased from 9.6% in 1983 to 5.7% in 1986.( refer to
Table 7) It was noticed that the company was showing a
lot of interest in the large-scale civil engineering
projects over contract value of HK$ 15 million (both about
60%) however, the ratio of successful tendering was
extremely low, particularly for the public sector projects.
As analysed above, this phenomenon was presumably due to
the derceasing civil engineering work and increasing
competition in the field.
On the other hand, the Company showed very little
interest in the smaller projects with contract value less
than HK$ 15 million, although the ratio of success was
slightly higher than that of larger ones.
To improve the ratio of success was the top priority
for civil engineering projects. An improved ratio of
would definitely bring about the increase in total
success
of successful. tenderings. Although individual
number
should be evaluated independently, the following
projects
marketing objectives are recommended as a general guideline
„-a AvPCtion for the Company to follow in 1987
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TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF TENDERING CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE GAMMON (HK) LTD
Contracts over HK$ 15 million
Public Public Private Private




58.5% 40.9% b68.4% 36..1%Ratio of
Interest
(1)/(2)





Contracts under HK$ 15 million
Public Public Private Private




31.6% 28% 28.6% 19%Ratio of
Interest
(1)/(2)
5.5% 4Z.9% 1 uI 3i..37oRatio of
success
(2)/ (3)
(1) No. of invitations to tender appeared
(2) No. of tenders which were tendered
(3) No. of success
Source: Various internal record in Gammon (HK) Ltd
59
(A) maintain its market share at 6% in this segment
(B) maintain the ratio of interest at about 60%, for both
small and large contracts
(C) strive to increase the ratio of success at 15% to 20%
The following marketing strategies are recommended
to increase the chance of successful tendering and achieve
these marketing objectives:
(a) The tender submission process should be a more
competitor-oriented approach rather than a cost-plus
method. The traditional method of determining the tender
price was to add a fixed percentage of profit margin on the
total material/labor cost of the construction project
without much regarding the competitive forces. In adopting
a competitor-oriented approach, the percentage of profit
margin might be different under different market and
competitive conditions. To facilitate this, more research
into the past tendering track record of potential
competitors in similar projects should be done.e.g. a
particular potential competitor had no tender in hand for a
long time would very likely to bid at very low price and
desperate to 'buy into' any projects. This kind of
competitive-oriented bidding approach is particularly
useful in tendering for Government projects where pricing
a critical factor to determine the success of any
is
tender.
(b) Get into Jointventures or even subcontractor role with
the overseas competitors may be an alternative to maintain
P,ar,mn-nNK') Ltd' s market share in civil engineering
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projects, particularly for projects requiring financial
packages- deferred payment or build now, pay later
packages. Better liaison with the active Japanese, Korean
and PRC contractors should be maintained. In addition to
Nishimatsu Construction' Co, close liaison with the
financially strong Aoki Corp., Sumitomo Corp., Kumagai Gumi
Corp., Maeda Corp and Mitsui Construction Co Ltd is
recommended because they had very sound financial resources
and worldwide construction experience. The Company's
knowledge and experience of the local construction market
and the good connection with the small local contractors
can be beneficial for the Jaspanese ones. On the other
hand, the Company can get access to their financial
resources and learn their advanced construction technology
and method during the progress of the projects. Another
advantage is that the Company can exploit the good
relationship with the giant contractors and joint venture
with them to explore overseas projects.
Building Segment
The Company's market share in this segment had
increased from 7.75% in 1983 to 8.57% in 1986, this
increase contrasted favourably with the decreasing market
share of civil engineering projects.( refer to Table 6)
Table 7 showed that Gammon (HK) Ltd was showing very
little interest and too selective in the large-scale
building projects (at very low ratio of interest of about
38%) for both public and private sectors. However, the
ratio of success was higher than civil engineering
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projects, particularly in Government building projects. In
light of the fact that the profitability of building
projects were usually higher than the civil engineering
ones and the Company presently had some excess manpower and
plant capacity for the building projects, it is recommended
that the Company can show more interest in tendering for
the building jobs.
Similar to the low-value civil engineering jobs, the
Company showed comparatively less interest in the smaller
building projects under HK$ 15 million however, its ratio
of successful tendering was extremely high (about 40%). So
that if the Company can show more interest in the
lower-value jobs, its turnover and market share in this
segment will definitely increase in future.
The high ratio of success in the building segments
coincided with the reasoning that the Company had
competitive edge over the local contractors who are
dominating this market segment. In light of this, it is
recommended that the Company should loosen up its selection
criteria and less selective in choosing building projects.
To increase the ratio of interest in this kind of project
is a critical step to bring about the increase in total
number of successful tenderings. In light of this, the
following marketing objectives are proposed as a general
guideline in 1987:
(A) increase market share in this segment to about 10%
(B) show more interest in the building projects and
increase the ratio of interest to 50% for private sector
(c) increase this ratio of interest to 60% for public
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sector
(D) maintain the success ratio at 350 fcsr large projects
and 40% for small projects
The suggestion to show more interest and concentrate
on public-housing projects are behind the following
rationale:
(a) This was the segment traditionally occupied by the
local contractors, they had 82.8% and 67.7% market share of
this segment in 1984, and 1985 respectively.( refer to
Table 3) Some of these local building contractors were
losing their market share due to their bad track record in
concrete deficiency of past public estate projects.
Moreover, the Japanses and Korean contractors were not as
active in this segment as in other civil engineering work.
This market niche is worth pursuing for Gammon (HK) Ltd due
tot good track record in private building projects.
(b) The Housing Authority, being the largest client for
building works, will be a stable and safe source of work
for contractors. it was the Government's target to produce
188,300 housing units (inculding rental housing, Private
Sector Participation Scheme and Home Ownership Scheme)
between fiscal year 1986- 1990 at an average of 47,000
units per year- which was a 10.4% increase on the
production levels of the-previous Years.1 On the other
hand the Government would not default on payments while
,
the credit status of private developers were difficult to
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evaluate and might different greatly from one to another.
(c) With more experience in bidding for similar public
building projects, e.g.bidding for all Home Ownership
Scheme Projects, similar tender submission procedures can
be used or pre-formatted to prepare further submissions
more efficiently and effectively. The competitive bidding
behaviour can also be studied more throughly and
systematically. This effect of scale of economy will be
beneficial and offset the effect of low profitability in
this segment in the long term.
Two out of the three projects obtained in the
large-scale prviate-building segment, namely the Exchange
Square Site B and Harcourt House project were initiated by
the Hong Kong Land Property Ltd. Due to the Company's
long-established business liaison with the Hong Kong Land
Property Limited, the Company got preferential treatment in
the selective tendering. Besides the Hong Kong Land
Comapny Ltd and Swire Properties Ltd that the Company had
long and good association, more liaison with other property
developers and Architectural consultants who are interested
and specialized in building projects should be maintained
and cultivated to further increase the ratio of success
for private-building segment. More liaison and relationship
should also be established with some local merchant bankers
who are interested and. experienced in providing financing
packages to the contractors in the construction projects.
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The major marketing problems encountered by Gammon
(HK) Ltd are summarized in this Chapter, then appropriate
marketing objectives and strategies are recommended to
solve these problems. Finally, the local construction
market is analyzed. with the concept of warfare strategies
developed by Philip Kotler.
Marketing Problems
The deteriorating performance of the Company in the
civil engineering type of projects was the major cause of
the poor performance in the mid-1980s, the author
recommends that the Company concentrate more on the
building projects in future. As detailed in the previous
chapters, the major marketing problems the Company faced
in the civil engineering projects were mainly the
following two:
(A) Due to the political reasons, the prospects and job
opportunities in the large-scale civil engineering field
are not as bright as' the building ones as it drags near
1997, this is because the HK Government does not want to
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commit more large investment in the infrastructure
development 'and then the colony is turned back to the PRC
in 1997.
Figure 1 clearly showed that the total share of
expenditure allocated to civil engineering jobs was
decreasing constantly relative to the building counterparts
since the mid-1970s, this trend is expected to continue in
the near. future.
(B) The overseas contractors were extremely active in the
civil engineering field and less active in the building
ones. Referring to Table 3, the overseas contractors'
market share in the local civil engineering market was 48%
while only 32% in public housing in 1985. This showed that
the competitive force and profit margin squeeze was more
severe in civil engineering jobs. This fact was partly
reflected in the lower tender successful ratio of Gammon
(HK) Ltd's in the civil engineering jobs in 1986.
Other major marketing problems included:
(C)The Marketing Department of the Company was not doing a
very comprehensive record-keeping and formal marketing
research function on local project opportunities due to the
lack of human resources.
(D)Except a very small number of big property developers
and architectural consultants, the Company did not have
close: business and interpersonal relationship with other
clients and the Government officials in the Housing
Authority or the Public Works Department.
the increased competition in the Hong Kong market
(E)Due to
and adhering to the principle of not to put' all the eggs
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in one basket, the Company was seriously considering to
increase diversifying geographically into the PRC and
other South East Asian countries, e.g. the Mass Transit
Railway project in Singapore. Yet the lack of marketing
intelligence and close contacts with the foreign clients in
these countries remained a major problem for the
diversification process.
Marketing Objectives and Strategies
Although the competition was very severe in the
civil engineering jobs, the Company should maintain its
market share and fully utilize its existing human and
plant resources. In light of this, the first marketing
objective is to maintain its market share at 6% in the
civil engineering market in 1987, it is instrumental that
the Company have to strive hard to increase its ratio of
successful tendering to 15% to 20%.
The following marketing strategies are suggested to
achieve the first objective:
a. To increase the chance of successful tendering, the
tender submission process should be a more research-based,
competitor-oriented and flexible approach rather than the
traditional cost-plus approach.
b. To establish more and closer liaison with the overseas
contractors and get more into jointventureships with them
in the civil engineering projects, thus getting access to
their financial and technical capabilities.
c. To acquire specialist construction plants and
An„-inments and apply new construction techniques. e.g.
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deep basement excavation and foundation construction
methods. This will increase its efficiency and
productivity in the future projects. So that the Company
can bid at more competitive prices in the long-term.
d. To set up strong project management teams to minimize
the wastage of material and labour resources. This will
also enhance the co-ordination with various small
sub-contractors to cut down the unnecessary overheads and
improve the profit margin.
The second marketing objective is to increase its
market share in the building segment to 10% by increasing
the ratio of interest in these projects to 50 to 60%.
The following strategies are suggested to accomplish
this objective:
a. The criteria for tendering opportunities should be
loosen up for 'the building 'projects, in this way the
Company can tender for more projects.
b. The Company resource should be 'planned more
systematically to cope with the increasing workload.
c. It can adopt more efficient and innovative method of
building construction. e.g. the System Formwork can reduce
20% of the cost of construction and shorten the
construction period. This method is very suitable for
buildings with standard design, such as the public
housing.
d.Special attention should be paid to the PSPS2 HOS, the
small-to -medium residential housing and office projects.
The third marketing objective is to strengthen the
human resource in the Marketing Department of. the Company
to (A) perform formal and systematic record-keeping and
69marketing research functions and (B) contact various
clients and architectural firms actively.
The first strategy is to (A) perform comprehensive
record-keeping and marketing research on the following
fields:
a. The record-keeping and forecasting of the fluctuating
tender price and labour/material cost.
b. Competitive analysis to check how are different
competitors' strengths and weaknesses (financially and
technically) in different market segments, keep a
comprehensive track record of their tendering
characteristics and then plan whether it is feasible to
get into jointventures with them.
c. The Company should monitor closely the construction
prospects of the different market segments and their
specific needs( e.g. the financial packages, construction
method requirements and preferences) as well as
individual project opportunities in the data base. It
should keep a comprehensive track record of the projects
appeared in the daily newspapers, contractors' magazines
and various informal channel and refer them to the
Tendering Department immediately for review.
d. Analysis of the track record of the successful and
unsuccessful tenders in different market segments for
analysis of profit margin characteristics and establishing
reliable evaluation criteria for selection of prospective
tenders. This track record should be kept in the cost data
be reviewed periodically by the top management.
base and
e. Analysis of the competition, prospects and risks
ro.- n„nmc or political) of investing in the PRC and other
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South East Asian countries, then decide whether the
Company should establish permanent offices and put in more
human and other resources there. Although the Company had
certain involvement in the.Southeast Asian region, yet no
major achievement is achieved. The major problem was
unfamiliarity with the overseas constructon practices. In
light of this, jointventures with the local contractors
seems to be the only logical stepping stone in expanding
overseas, the Company should study whether this is
feasible.
The second strategy is (B) Senior management
personnel in the Company should establish and maintain
close and personal relationships with the following
parties( possibly through the wide connection of the
Company's principal, the Jardin, Matheson Co of Hongkong
):
a. The local property developers and architectural
consultants, particularly those interested in the Home
Ownership Scheme or other building projects.
b. The merchant bankers who were used to providing project
financial packages for property developers but not to
contractors directy. The Company should try to give them
incentives to persuade them to provide the packages
directly to it in certain lucrative projects.
c. Government officials in different Governmental
departments. e.g., the Housing Authority and the Public
Works Department.
d. Certain large contractors who is interested in getting
into' ointventures with the Company in the local and
overseas markets.
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A Warfare Strategic Perspective
In view of the increasing competitive environment in
the local construction industry, all contractors should
adopt the more flexible and competitor-oriented mentality
and approach rather than the traditional
cost-plus-oriented approach in the bidding process. They
should also be more selective in choosing the market niche
where their competitivefegdes can exert. It is useful to
view the local environment with the concept of warfare
strategies.
The overseas contractors were launching the
price-based frontal attacks on the local contractors, both
in the building and civil engineering segments. Overseas
contractors could match or even emulate their local
counterparts on every counts( e.g. speed, technology and
quality of the construction projects) and beat them on
lower pricing and offering financial packages to the
developers. They were particularly successful in the civil
engineering and other large-scale building projects.
The overseas contractors could do this because of
their financial resources( some of them belonged to the
giant General Trading Companies and thus got easy access
to the .huge financial support) and- technological
resources( the Korean ones gained wide experience in the
Middle-East and the Japanese ones gained wide experience
in the South East Asian region and in the U.S.) were
much stronger than the local ones.
This had provoked severe retaliatory competitive
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responses from the local contractors. All contractors were
bidding at very low pricing and the profit margin was
shrinking as a whole for the entire industry. The local
contractors were adopting different strategies to defend
their existing market shares and positions. One defense
strategy was to seek third-party intervention. e.g., some
local contractors grouped together to lobby the Hong Kong
Government to restrict the activities of the overseas
contractors in only certain kinds of projects. However, in
light of the fact that the Hong Kong Government is
adhering closely to its laissez-faire policy to minimize
its intervention on this issue, the chance of'success is
very slim for this strategy.
Moreover, most contractors were adopting the
flanking-position defense strategy to defend and protect
their traditional market segments or niches. They did not
have the necessary technological and financial capability
to launch a head-on frontal defense strategy against the
overseas giants. Different groups of List I contractors
had their own ways to cope with different competitive
environment.
The smallest contractors in the List I were the
Group A contractors. They were surviving by clinging to
their traditional low-value building or other projects
below contract value of HK$ 3 million, facing very limited
competition from the Group B and C contractors and no
competition from the List*II overseas contractors.
The bigger Group B List I contractors were bidding
for contracts below HK$ 15 million, they faced the
from the small Group A contractors in projects
competition
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under HK$ 3 million and the competition from Group C
contractors on all projects. On the other hand, they are
fortunate not to face any competition from the List II
overseas contractors.
The biggest local contractors were the Group C
contractors in the List I, they could bid for projects
with any contract value. The projects that attracted them
most were the projects over HK$ 15 million, this segment
was where the overseas List II contractors could bid for,
so that the competition was very severe in this segment.
The author recommends the Gammon (HK) Ltd to adopt
flanking defense strategy to defend its own flank. It
should select certain market segments or flanks that it
can defend. An analysis of the competitive strength and
weakness of the Company showed that its technological
capability and reputation were good in both the building
and civil engineering projects, with the building projects
excellent and well-known in the industry. its weakness was
that its financial capability was limited when contrasted
with the giant overseas counterparts. This would surely
render it in a handicapped position when bidding for big
projects that requires financial packages.
The author recommends that the Company should
rethink its present marketing strategy of concentrating on
the big civil engineering projects over HK$ 15 million. It
should diversify more into the medium and small value
building and civil engineering type of projects. Two
specific strategies are recommended to the Company:
(1) Flankin g position defense strategy is recommended in
the high-value contracts. It can survive the fierce
74competition in the civil engineering and the high-value
building jobs by getting involved more in jointventures
with the overseas contractors. What the overseas ones can
offer are their superior financial and technological
capabilities. On the other hand, what Gammon (HK) Ltd can
offer in return is that it is more familiar with the local
marketplace, the local construction expertise and the
closer ties with the local developers and the consultant
firms.
(2) It should adopt the frontal attack strategy to
actively establish its market position in the smaller
buildings and civil engineering projects under HK$ 15
million, which were being dominated by the small local
Group A and Group B contractors. Gammon (HK) Ltd will be
in a more advantageous position to compete with them in
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